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Abstract— A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is based on a 
trust model defined by the original X.509 standard and is 
composed of three entities: the Certification Authority, the 
certificate holder (subject) and the Relying Party. The CA 
plays the role of a trusted third party between the subject and 
the RP. A trust evaluation problem is raised when an RP 
receives a certificate from an unknown subject that is signed 
by an unknown CA. Different approaches have been proposed 
to handle this trust problem. We argue that these approaches 
work only in the closed deployment model where RPs are also 
subjects, but cannot work in the open deployment model 
where they are not. Our objective is to identify the deficiencies 
in the existing trust approaches that try to help RPs to make 
trust decisions about certificates in the Internet, and to 
introduce the new X.509 approach based on a trust broker. 
Index Terms— Public Key Infrastructure, X.509, · 
Certification Authority, Trust management, Trust Broker. 
I. Introduction 
A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is based on the trust 
model described in the original X.509 (1988) standard and is 
composed of three entities: the Certification Authority (CA), 
the certificate holder (or subject) and the Relying Party (RP). 
The CA plays the role of a trusted third party (TTP) between 
the subject and the RP. This trust model is only appropriate for 
the closed deployment model of a PKI, in which the RPs and 
subjects are all certificate holders with the same set of CAs. It 
is not appropriate for the open deployment model where the RP 
has no explicit relationship with any CA. This is because RPs 
are now supposed to build their trust decisions by analysing a 
set of CA documents (Certificate Policy (CP) and Certification 
Practice Statement (CPS)) to answer many technical and legal 
questions like: what happens when the CA does not correctly 
check the identity of the certificate holder, or worse, issues a 
certificate to a person with a false identity? What happens if the 
certificate is false and I lose $1000? Is the CA responsible? etc. 
[2]. This is an impossible task for most RPs. 
We believe that helping RPs in the open model to make 
informed decisions about a certificate’s trustworthiness entails 
the following steps: 
1. Defining a new model of trust:  In previous work [7], 
we proposed to add a new role of Trust Broker (TB) to 
the X.509 model, which contracts with RPs to help 
them make an informed decision about a CA (i.e. 
whether to accept a subject’s certificate for a particular 
transaction or not). This new entity should be 
independent of PKIs and play the roles of both technical 
and legal expert for the RPs. By explicitly adding this 
trusted role to the original X.509 trust model, the task of 
RPs is simplified, and the responsibility of the TB can 
be formally engaged. This new four cornered trust 
model (see Fig. 1) is now incorporated into the ITU-T 
draft amendment to the 2016 edition of X.509, 
2. Specifying protocols for the interaction of TBs with 
CAs and RPs, 
3. Building software tools to help RPs and TBs participate 
in this new trust eco-system. 
 
Fig. 1.The new X.509 trust model 
The main objectives of this paper are to identify the 
deficiencies in the existing trust approaches for helping RPs to 
make informed decisions about certificates, and to provide a 
brief outline of steps 2. We demonstrate that none of existing 
trust approaches help RPs when they encounter unknown 
certificates in the open model.  
The analysis of the deficiencies led us to define a new trust 
management approach, called the Unified Approach. It 
combines the advantages of the existing trust approaches, and 
is applicable to both the closed and the open PKI deployment 
models. We terminate this paper by concluding our analysis 
and presenting our future work. 
II. Analysis of the Existing Trust Approaches 
There are several alternative approaches that permit a RP to 
trust a certificate. These approaches entail two important 
mechanisms: 
• A contractual process for recognizing CAs: this is used to 
prove that a given CA meets the legal and technical 
requirements of trustworthiness and interoperability. 
• A mechanism for conveying the recognition of trustworthy 
CAs into the RPs computer system: this is used to provide 
information about the trustworthiness of a CA in a 
machine-readable format, so that when the RP receives a 
digital certificate it can automatically decide to accept it or 
not. This is achieved via configuration of at least one root 
of trust, or trust anchor, into the RP’s system by some out 
of band means. Subsequently certificate chains can be 
carried in an application level protocol. Providing the chain 
starts at an already configured root of trust, then the entire 
set of CAs in the certificate chain can be trusted. If it does 
not, then the entire set of CAs will be untrusted. There are 
several topologies to facilitate the building of certificate 
chains: the hierarchical topology, web of trust topology and 
the bridge topology. 
The existing approaches can be classified into two main 
categories: (1) trust topologies managed by CAs themselves 
and (2) a list of roots of trust managed by the RP or by a trusted 
third party (TTP) that is independent of the CAs and is acting 
on behalf of the RP. The aim of this section is to present these 
approaches. In each approach, we discuss the transmission 
mechanisms, the political process and the applicability of the 
approach to the open and closed deployment models. 
A. Inter-CA Trust Topologies 
CAs can build trust topologies between themselves instead 
of leaving this task to inexperienced RPs. The main idea is that 
each RP trusts a CA (called a root of trust or trust anchor), 
which in turn certifies other CAs for its RPs. Thus, in these 
topologies, CAs play two roles: Certificate Manager and 
certificates recommender. Trust relationships between CAs are 
technically formalized using cross-certificates issued to each 
other. 
 
Fig. 2.Trust Chain Topologies 
The trust chains can be organized in a hierarchy, web of trust 
or via a bridge CA as illustrated in Fig. 2. Each arrow depicts 
the direction of a trust link. In CA hierarchies, the trust chains 
flow from the superior CA to the subordinate CAs, whereas in 
a Bridge CA topology the trust chains flow in both directions 
through the Bridge. In a web of trust, the trust chains are ad-
hoc and random. These topologies are used to transmit the 
recognition of a certificate to the members of the 
interconnected domains. In these topologies, a certification 
path must be established between the RP and the certificate 
holder in order to check the validity of a certificate. The 
certification path starts from a trust anchor of the RP and ends 
with the subject’s certificate. 
All these topologies are based on one process called cross 
certification. Currently, there is no standardized process for 
cross-certification, which covers legal, political and technical 
assessments. One of the most detailed processes is that defined 
by the Federal Public Key infrastructure (FPKI) [6]. It gives 
explicit documentation about each step, as follows: 
• Presentation of the request: The applicant CA must provide 
a formal written request to the FPKI Policy Authority 
(FPKIPA) containing certain information. 
• Policy mapping process: the criterion-by-criterion 
comparison of the certification policy of the applicant CA 
with the CP of any one of the CAs of the FPKI to assess 
whether the policies, practices and procedures of the 
applicant have an equivalent level to those of the CAs of 
the FPKI. 
• Audit examination: The applicant CA must provide 
assurance that its operations reflect perfectly its CP and 
CPS. It must undergo a compliance audit by a qualified 
independent auditor who meets the criteria requested by the 
FPKI.  
• Technical test of interoperability: The applicant CA must 
be technically compatible with the FPKI. The technical 
compatibility is determined by the examination of the 
technical information provided by the applicant CA.  
• Negotiation for the establishment of an agreement: in order 
to conclude a common consensus of all points.  
• Maintenance: provides mechanisms for managing the cross-
certification relationships between the different entities and 
to terminate an agreement if one party does not fulfil the 
terms and conditions of the cross-certification agreement. 
Inter-CA topologies are usually applied to the closed 
deployment model of PKIs. However, the implementation of 
inter-CA topologies in the open model, where all the CAs in 
the world are interconnected, is not feasible. One could 
imagine a topology composed of cross certified national root 
CAs in which each root CA manages cross certification 
processes with their subordinate CAs located in their 
jurisdictions. However, even this cannot be easily achieved for 
several reasons:  
1. Technically, this topology cannot be implemented 
because of the difficulty of managing long certification 
paths [5]. The validation process requires several checks 
to be made along the certification path (e.g. policy 
constraints, certificate status, policy mappings, etc.). The 
complexity increases with the size of the certificate chain. 
2. This topology is similar to a general accreditation system 
where all CAs must be certified by their national 
authorities. However, countries do not have the same 
viewpoint concerning the right organizational model of 
PKIs. For certain countries, national accreditation may 
limit innovation and competition between CAs.  
3. Imagining that the national CAs (root or bridge) can cross 
certify each other implies that a technical and legal 
harmonization can be conceived between different 
nations. In reality this is too difficult to achieve because 
of cultural and legal differences between countries. 
4. This topology requires a standardization of the 
certification process so that a cross-certification realized 
by one national CA would be accepted by other national 
CAs. However, there is no standard cross certification 
process today. 
B. Recognition by an RP or an Independent TTP 
Trust in a certificate can be recommended by any entity 
independent of CAs. The basic idea is that users in a given 
community of interest can obtain information and advice from 
the leader of this community about the relevance of 
certificates for their electronic transactions. The recommender 
should have a technical and legal expertise sufficient to inform 
its users about the relevance of a certificate for a given type of 
transaction. The recommender could be a government (e.g. 
PKI Gate-Keeper in Australia [1]), or any organization such as 
a software vendor (e.g. Microsoft or Mozilla). 
In general, the recommenders create a list of minimum 
requirements and recognize all CAs whose certificates have 
assurance levels greater than the minimum requirements. Web 
browsers are the best-known examples of this approach 
(Microsoft Root Certificate Program [3], and Mozilla CA 
Certificate Policy Inclusion [4]). 
In contrast with the previous approach, this approach has 
only one mechanism used to transmit the recognition of 
certificates, which is the trust list. There is no homogeneous 
way to define or formalize the trust lists. While some lists of 
certificates are just simple lists (e.g. stores of certificates in 
Web browsers) where RPs can themselves add, edit, or delete 
certificates; others can be signed lists by the recommender 
where RPs cannot modify the list. From an interoperability 
viewpoint, the trust list replaces the cross-certificates used in 
inter-CA topologies. The user trusts the issuer of the list and 
transitive trust extends this to the CAs contained in the list. As 
a consequence, the issuer of the list plays the role of trust 
anchor, but is not a CA. 
The trust list topology may be built using a political process 
called the cross recognition process. This process is defined by 
the Telecommunications Working Group of the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum as “An interoperability 
arrangement in which a relying party in one PKI domain can 
use authority information in another PKI domain to 
authenticate a subject in the other PKI domain, and vice 
versa” [8]. 
Cross-recognition differs from cross-certification by the fact 
that it is not performed by a CA. Another difference is that 
cross-recognition requires only political and legal 
arrangements and leaves the technical compatibility issues to 
applications. Finally, cross-recognition requires no 
mechanisms for handling certification paths. 
Currently, there is no standardized process for cross-
recognition. The recognition process of the Australian PKI 
Gatekeeper [1] is considered one of the most documented 
processes. It provides a rigorous accreditation process for 
organizations and service providers that wish to issue digital 
certificates to be used by government agencies. It also 
provides a mechanism for interoperability based on cross-
recognition to help Australian Government departments (i.e. 
RPs) make decisions about external certificates from PKIs that 
are not accredited by the Gatekeeper. 
The Gatekeeper process of cross-recognition requires a 
harmonization of policies between the two PKI domains. 
Before accepting the cross-recognition of a particular domain, 
the competent authority in the Gatekeeper PKI must ensure 
that the authorities in the non-Gatekeeper impose requirements 
and standards that are comparable to those of Gatekeeper 
PKIs. Another assurance mechanism is the commitment of the 
recognized PKI to undergo regular audits. The Gatekeeper 
cross recognition process includes the following steps: 
1) Information sharing => 2) Gap analysis => 3) Risk 
evaluation => 4) Risk attenuation => 5) Negotiation => 6) 
Policies harmonization => 7) Documentation => 8) Signing 
agreements =>  9) Maintenance and surveillance. 
Both authorities in the concerned PKIs start by exchanging 
detailed information about their PKIs, and then apply a gap 
analysis to identify the differences between them. They 
conduct a risk evaluation process to determine whether these 
differences are significant or not. If they are important, the 
cross-recognition is not granted by the Gatekeeper authority. 
The harmonization of policies between the two domains 
requires several inspections, in particular: 
1) The status of the standards applied in every domain 
whether they are international or not, 2) The legal status of 
certificates in each domain, 3) Data privacy laws, 4) Liability 
regimes, 5) Consumer protection laws, and 6) Audit 
requirements. 
Several steps of this process are similar to those of the cross-
certification process that was presented in the previous 
section; the only major difference is the absence of steps to 
achieve compatibility of the techniques such as configuration 
directories and certificate profiles. 
Thanks to the independence of the recommender from CAs 
and the absence of need to build certification paths for the 
validation of certificates, the recognition approach is more 
convenient to the open deployment model of PKIs. However, 
the current application of this approach is not optimal for the 
open deployment model, for several reasons: 
1. The nature of the RP’s relation with the recommender is 
not formally defined. It can be formal as in the case of the 
Gatekeeper strategy or non-formal as in the case of web 
browsers,  
2. The cross-recognition process is a manual not-reproducible 
process; it is performed manually by experts who should 
examine very large documents that include a lot of political 
and legal information,  
3. This approach provides only a binary response, recognized 
or not. Unrecognized certificates are not banned to RPs 
since they are constantly exposed to them and a decision 
must be made. For unrecognized certificates, RPs may still 
be invited to inspect the policies of CAs to decide whether 
the certificates are suitable for their transactions or not. 
The best known example is the web browser, when RPs 
receive certificates signed by CAs that are not included in 
the trust list of their browser. The RP is asked to take a 
decision about the untrusted CA’s certificate.  
III. The Unified Approach: A New Trust Approach for 
Helping RPs  
We use the term “Unified Approach” to indicate the 
applicability of our approach to both the open and closed 
deployment models of PKIs. Our approach combines the 
advantages of the current trust topologies. It can help RPs to 
make the correct decisions about certificates.  
We propose a set of quantitative and qualitative information 
that explains the quality of a CA’s certification process to RPs. 
The Trust Broker (TB), as proposed in the new X.509 trust 
model, can setup a service that provides this information to 
RPs (Fig. 3) on demand. The retrieval of recommendations 
can therefore be made simple and dynamic. Furthermore, there 
is no need to handle long certificate validation paths as is the 
case for inter-CA topologies. 
 
Fig. 3. The TB Service and Protocol 
 At the quantitative/qualitative level, we propose that the 
TB service sends contextual information, in the form of 
allowed certificate usage information that can help RPs to 
make an informed decision. The determination of this 
information can be obtained from the CP of the CA by the TB 
service and relayed as usage information to the RP. A context 
detector at the side of the RP can compare the actual 
application context with the usage information sent by the TB 
service without compromising the privacy of the user. 
At a purely quantitative level, the TB service can send a 
score between 0 and 1 that represents the quality of the 
certificate, which we term the certificate level of assurance 
(CLoA). When the CLoA is 0, this indicates that the 
procedures followed by the CA to manage the subject 
certificates are very weak or non-existent. When the CLoA is 
1, the applied procedures are very strong and faultless.  
The TB service is able to handle all CAs regardless of their 
technical, geographic or legal situation, and may dynamically 
add new CAs to its database according to RP demand. The 
CLoA information may be complemented by another score 
that we call the confidence level (CL), which lies in the range 
from 0 to 1. This indicates the extent to which the TB service 
is confident about its CLoA score. 
IV. Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper, we have analysed the existing trust 
approaches and shown than none of them meet the needs of 
RPs in the Internet. In on-going work, we have defined an 
algorithm for computing CLoA and CL values, and a protocol 
for transferring these between a web browser and trust broker. 
We have built a proof of concept TB service that we propose 
to validate by conducting experiments with users to 
demonstrate its impact and usability. 
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